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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j)(Rep. Vol. 9 2007) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Did the Court below err when it granted summary judgment by concluding that 
Plaintiffs failed to come forward with evidence of damages? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A district court's granting of a motion for summary judgment is reviewed for 
correctness; viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Mountain Estate Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. 
& Tel. Co.. 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from two separate summary judgments entered in the underlying 
case. 
The Court below granted summary judgment for both defendants on one issue, 
damages, holding that Plaintiffs had not come forward with any evidence of damages. 
(R. 5368, R, 5358). 
Plaintiffs, however, had presented an affidavit of Avner Kalay, a world renowned 
economist, which gave a range of damages for Plaintiffs of between $4.2 million and 
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$6,706 million. (R. 4645,1114). 
Summary of the Claims 
In 1998, William Borghetti formed Campus Pipeline, Inc. (A Delaware 
Corporation f/k/a Campus Communications; hereafter "CPI"). (R. 1982, p. vii). Mr. 
Borghetti and the other Plaintiffs were all shareholders of common stock in CPI. (R. 
1855, p. 2). System and Computer Technology (hereinafter "SCT") made capital 
contributions to the company in exchange for common stock giving it 60% control over 
Campus Communications. (R. 1982, p. vii). 
In 1999 and 2000 CPI sold preferred shares in its company which gave the 
preferred shareholders the first $80.9 million in the event of a liquidation. (R. 1855, p.6-
7). 
In 2002, SCT, the largest and controlling shareholder made an offer to purchase 
CPI in a "cash out" merger. (R. 1855, p. 15). Defendant Thomas Weisel Partners, LLC 
("TWP") was retained by CPI to perform an appraisal/fairness opinion for CPI. (R. 1855, 
p. 15). TWP was only to be paid (a minimum of $800,000.00) if the company was in fact 
liquidated. (R. 1855, p. 15 and 16). 
On September 5, 2002, the CPI board of directors voted to approve a merger with 
SCT. (R. 1855, p. 21). The merger took effect on October 23, 2002 for a price of 
$42,000,000. (R. 5368, p.2). 
Plaintiffs stock was cancelled as a result of the acquisition, and they received nothing 
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(zero consideration) for their shares. (R. 5368, p.2). 
Despite the clear interests of the Campus Pipeline common stockholders to reject the 
acquisition, Campus Pipeline's directors and officers approved a transaction with SCT that 
gave significant value to insiders (money), including the directors and officers who approved 
the transaction, and to SCT (the company and its assets), but nothing at all to Campus 
Pipeline's common stock. (R. 3957, Ex. NN, lfl[5-14). 
Because Borghetti opposed the acquisition, he was entitled under section 262 of 
the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) to file an appraisal action in Delaware to 
seek a determination of the "fair value" of his shares in CPI as of the effective date of the 
acquisition. (R. 5368, p. 7). Section 262 of the DGCL requires that an appraisal action 
be filed within 120 days from the effective date of the acquisition. (R. 5368, p. 7). 
To address his remedies, Borghetti alleged that he entered into an attorney client 
relationship with the Bendinger defendants based upon numerous in person meetings, 
phone calls, retention of valuation professionals, and Bendinger's taking of the only copy 
of Mr. Borghetti's file. (R. 3957, fflf 1-35). The Bendinger defendants continued working 
with Mr. Borghetti on his case for over six months, during which time the statute of 
limitations for an appraisal action passed. (Id.). The Bendinger Defendants failed to file 
an appraisal action within 120 days and failed to advise Borghetti that they were not 
going to file such an appraisal action. (R. 3957, ffl[ 1-35). 
Plaintiffs brought this action against System and Computer Techology, Inc. and 
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Campus Pipeline's officers and directors for breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, 
misrepresentation and fraud. In this same litigation one of the Plaintiffs, William 
Borghetti, (hereinafter "Borghetti") brought a claim for legal malpractice against 
Bendinger, Crockett, Peterson and Casey and Jeffrey S. Williams (hereinafter "Bendinger 
defendants") for failing to timely file a Delaware state "appraisal action." 
Despite the length of their relationship, researching of appraisals and fraud claims, 
the hiring of a valuation expert, and six months of in person and telephone meetings, the 
Bendinger defendants denied the existence of the attorney client relationship and claimed 
that Borghetti suffered no damages. 
The SCT defendants claimed that they did their best to sell the corporation at the best 
price and that Plaintiffs suffered no damages. They also claimed since they sold at less than 
the liquidation preference that Plaintiffs could not show any damages. 
Plaintiffs claimed (a) that there was no reason to sell; (b) that there were many other 
options available to keep CPI a going concern; (c) that there were substantial conflicts of 
interests for all parties that "approved" the transaction; and (d) that Plaintiffs were damaged 
as a result of receiving zero consideration for their shares. 
Plaintiff William Borghetti ("Borghetti") claimed that CPI should not have 
approved the acquisition because it was unfair to the common shareholders since they 
received zero consideration. 
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The Kalay Opinions and the Opinions of the Defendants' Experts on the issue of 
Damages. 
Plaintiffs' expert, Avner Kalay is a professor at the David Eccles School of 
Business at the University of Utah where he teaches courses in valuation. He received his 
B.A. in economics from Tel Aviv University, a Masters in Business Administration from 
the University of Rochester and a PhD in Business Administration from the University of 
Rochester. (R. 4645, THfl-2). He was a Chairman of the Finance Department at Tel Aviv 
University, and a tenured member of NYU's business school faculty. (R. 4645,1fl[3-4). 
Professor Kalay has published numerous articles in leading finance journals and formerly 
worked as a consultant for the SEC (R. 4645, fflj5-6). 
In March 2006 Kalay prepared a valuation report for this matter in which he 
utilized an option pricing theory in order to value Campus Pipeline. (R. 3247, exh. C). 
Kalay determined that Campus Pipeline had a value of $63.6 million and $72.9 million at 
the end of 2002 and that the fair value of the Plaintiffs' shares at the time of the "cash 
out" merger was between $4.2 million and $6,706 million. (R. 4645, f t 13-14). 
To arrive at that value, Kalay used what is known as the Black-Scholes method of 
valuation. (R. 4645,115). 
Kalay's conclusions in his report concerning use of the Black-Scholes 
methodology are highly supported by the available literature. Fischer Black and Myron 
Scholes won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1997 for their work "The Pricing of 
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Options and Corporate Liabilities." (R. 4645, ^29b). 
The Black-Scholes model is the seminal work in options pricing theory and it has 
not only been utilized in valuing options, but has been used to value equity and debt in a 
company. (R. 4645, ffl29a). 
Nonetheless, the District Court granted summary judgment for both groups of 
Defendants on the erroneous conclusion that Plaintiffs did not have evidence of damages. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The granting of summary judgement was incorrect because there was a disputed 
fact: the fair value of Plaintiffs' shares at the time of the merger. The district court's 
conclusion either disregarded the damage calculation of Avner Kalay, or it incorrectly 
concluded that the market value of the company on the date of the merger was the proper 
calculation of damages. 
Delaware law clearly required that the district court determine the fair value of the 
Plaintiffs shares as opposed to the market value of the company. In determining such 
fair value, the court was required to take into account all relevant factors, including the 
expert opinion of Dr. Kalay. 
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
KALAY'S AFFIDAVIT CLEARLY STATED THAT THE FAIR VALUE OF 
PLAINTIFFS' SHARES IN CPI WAS BETWEEN $4.2 MILLION AND $6,706 
MILLION. THAT FACT, WHILE DISPUTED BY THE DEFENDANTS' 
EXPERTS, REQUIRED THAT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS BE 
DENIED. 
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine 
issues of material fact, the appellate court views the facts and all reasonable inferences in 
a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Neiderhauser Bldrs. & Dev. 
Corp. v. Campbell 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Court accords no deference 
to a trial court's legal conclusions given to support the grant of summary judgment, but 
reviews them for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 
1991). It only takes one sworn statement to dispute averments on the other side of 
controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v. 
Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). The presence of a dispute as to material facts 
disallows the granting of a summary judgment. Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 
P.2d 238 (Utah 1977). 
In its order granting summary judgment to the SCT defendants, the District Court 
stated: 
Plaintiffs have failed to come forward with evidence creating a genuine 
issue of material fact on the question of whether they suffered damages. 
Because damages are a necessary element of each of the causes of action 
they bring against Defendants, Plaintiffs cannot prevail on an of their claims 
as a matter of law. (R. 5358, p 3-4). 
That conclusion failed to recognize or account for paragraph 14 of Avner Kalay's 
affidavit in opposition to the motions for summary judgment. That paragraph reads: 
14. In the March 2006 report later modified by my deposition testimony, 
I concluded that the fair value of Mr. Borghetti's shares at the time of the 
merger was between $4.2 million and $6,706 million." 
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Under both the legal malpractice causes of action and the breach of fiduciary duty, 
unjust enrichment, misrepresentation and fraud causes of action, the measure of the 
Plaintiffs' damages was the value of their shares of common stock in CPI at the time of 
the merger when they were cancelled. Dr. Kalay's opinion was that they were worth 
between four and six million dollars at the time they were cancelled. 
Thus, there was a disputed fact: the value of the Plaintiffs' shares. Because there 
was a disputed fact, the granting of summary judgment was incorrect and should be 
overturned. 
THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE MARKET 
VALUE OF THE COMPANY ON THE DATE OF THE MERGER WAS THE 
ONLY PROPER CALCULATION OF DAMAGES. 
In Weinberger v. UOP. Inc.. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme 
Court explicitly broadened the interpretation of the Delaware Corporations Code, section 
262 on appraisal rights, and adopted a more liberal approach to the valuation process (Id. 
at 704). The Court concluded that an exclusive method for valuation was outmoded and a 
more liberal approach to stock valuation and appraisal proceedings must include proof of 
value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the 
financial community (Id. at 712). They held that the most popularly employed techniques 
for valuation no longer exclusively control appraisal and valuation proceedings, and that 
alternative valuation techniques should be allowed. (Id. at 713; See also, Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 296-297 (Del. 1996)). The Court in Weinberger further 
concluded that when determining the value that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for 
that which has been taken from him, a number of relevant factors are to be included. The 
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Court stated: 
In determining what figure represents [the] true or intrinsic value, the 
appraiser and the courts must take into consideration all factors and 
elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of value. Thus, 
market value, asset value, dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the 
enterprise and any other facts which were known or which could be 
ascertained as of the date of merger and which throw any light on future 
prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent to an inquiry as 
to the value of the dissenting stockholders' interest, but must be considered 
by the agency fixing the value. . . This is not only in accord with the 
realities of present day affairs, but it is thoroughly consonant with the 
purpose and intent of our statutory law. It is significant that section 262 
now mandates the determination of 'fair' value based upon 'all relevant 
factors.' Only the speculative elements of value that may arise from the 
'accomplishment or expectation" of the merger are excluded. We take this 
to be a very narrow exception to the appraisal process.... But elements of 
future value, including the nature of the enterprise, which are known or 
susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger and not the product of 
speculation, may be considered. (Id. at 713; italics in original) 
Thus, not only are acceptable valuation methods to be liberally construed by the Courts, 
but, according to Weinberger all the relevant factors should be included when 
determining value as well (See Also, Cede & Co. at 295 *). 
Even elements of "future value" may be considered. Weinberger and all of its 
progeny dictate that "market value" is simply a fact to be used in coming up with "fair 
1
 The Court in Cede Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. cited and followed Weinberger for the 
proposition that the Court must broaden the process for determining fair value, and 
factors that are not the product of speculation may be considered when determining value, 
including the nature of the enterprise (Cede Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (1996) 684 A.2d 289, 
295). 
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value."2 In fact the Black-Scholes method used by Kalay utilized market value as a 
factor. Kalay first determined the market value of the company to be between $63.6 
million and $72.9 million. (R. 4645, |13). Kalay also accounted for the liquidation 
preference of approximately $82 million. Kalay utilized those figures and others to come 
up with the "fair value" of Plaintiffs shares (the range of the "fair value" lost was between 
$4.2 million and $6,706 million). 
Utah has also adopted a broad and liberal interpretation of the valuation methods 
that are allowed. In Bingham Consolidation Co. v. Groesbeck. 2004 UT App 434, 105 
P.3d 365 (Utah Ct. App. 2004), the Utah Court of Appeals stated that the goal of 
appraisal is to ascertain the actual worth of that which the dissenter loses . . . there are no 
fixed methods for valuating the shares, and most courts permit all generally accepted 
techniques of valuation used in the financial community. (Id. at 370, citing Oakridge 
Energy Inc. v. Clifton. 937 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1997), See also, Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma 
Corp.. 747 A.2d 549, 556 (Del. 2000)). They concluded that they are in agreement with 
other jurisdictions that, "a court should make use of all generally accepted techniques of 
valuation used in the financial community." (Bingham at 375, See also, Paskill Corp. at 
556). 
2
 This is precisely why defendant's own expert stated that shares can be "out of 
the money" yet still have value. An "out of the money" scenario is exactly what we have 
here because the liquidation preference exceeds market value. Commons shareholders in 
these scenarios must have protection - otherwise, they can be frozen out at any time for 
any reason. 
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Defendants' own expert, Grabowski, in his expert report of May 31, 2006 points 
out this exact contention. He states that, "The Black-Scholes option pricing model is 
widely accepted in the financial community as a methodology to estimate the price of an 
option, or derivative instrument, and . . . may be used in certain instances to provide the 
value of the equity of a company under financial distress." (R. 1982, Ex. W, Grabowski 
Report, p. 14). 
Pursuant to both Delaware and Utah law the Court should have liberally and 
broadly interpreted what valuation methods are to be allowed in such proceedings as this. 
The area of valuation is no longer controlled exclusively by certain methods, and those 
formulas and techniques which are generally accepted in the financial community are now 
clearly allowed by the Courts. (See, Weinberger at 712 and Bingham Consolidation at 
370). 
In stating that the Plaintiffs could not show damages, the District Court erred in 
two ways. 
First, as shown above, market value is not solely determinative of "fair value." 
Second, and more importantly, The market value of $73.7 million to $83.2 million 
cited by the Court was Professor Kalay's determination that Campus Pipeline as an entity 
had a market value of that amount at the time of the merger. Section 262 and the cases 
clearly state that the court is to determine the fair value of the shares on the date of the 
merger - not the company. It is a distinction that is not splitting hairs. 
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CPI was founded in 1998. In 2002, it was still clearly a start up venture. It is not 
surprising that the stock was "out of the money." Google, Yahoo, and any other startup 
company experiences a period of initial capitalization where expenditures exceed 
earnings. The Defendants' own expert acknowledged that "out of the money" stock still 
has value. For that reason, section 262 and the Delaware and Utah cases require that the 
value of the shares be determined - not the book, asset, or market value of the company. 
Each share of stock at the time of the merger was like owning a lottery ticket. If the 
company succeeded, they would have value. If the company ultimately failed, they would 
be worthless. The Plaintiffs had the right to continue to hold those shares and have the 
company continue in business. 
Just like a losing lottery ticket has no value - a potentially winning lottery ticket 
clearly has a value. CPI had not failed. Its stock clearly had a value or expectation 
interest. Dr. Kalay's opinion used Nobel prize winning methods to determine that value. 
It was the Defendants' experts who failed to provide any legitimate value. They-like the 
court-used market value of the company. It is axiomatic that a share of stock that shows 
any possibility of success, has a value. 
Instead of realizing on that value the common shareholders were given nothing. 
At the same time, the conflicted directors, the conflicted officers, and the controlling 
shareholder all walked away with either substantial cash payments or the company itself. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court below erred in simply looking at Professor Kalay's calculation of 
market value and holding such figures to be the "end all, be a i r in this action. Instead, 
the Court below should have focused on the "fair value" damage calculation from 
Professor Kalay. That fair value damage calculation clearly and undoubtedly shows that 
Plaintiffs suffered damages of between $4.2 million and $6,706 million. Respectfully, the 
Appellants request that both Summary Judgment Orders and Judgments be vacated and 
reversed and the case remanded for trial below. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM 
Attached as an addendum are: 
1. Delaware Corporations Code, section 262 
2. Affidavit of Avner Kalay 
3. Affidavit of Daniel Greenwood 
Dated this J day of October, 2007 
(JJA^ 
Curas L. Wenger, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I am a citizen of the United States and employed in Salt Lake County, Utah. I am 
over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business 
address is City Centre I, 175 East 400 South, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. I am 
readily familiar with this firm's practice for collection and processing of correspondence 
for mailing with the United States' Postal Service, Federal Express and hand delivery. 
On August 12,-£Q64f I placed for delivery via U.S. Mail two true and correct copies of the 
within document, APPELLANT'S BRIEF in a sealed envelope, to the following: 
John Pearce 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
170 South Main Street Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Stuart Schultz 
Strong & Hanni 
3 Triad Center Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
And, one original and nine copies of APPELLANT'S BRIEF were served, 
[ ] via United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, to: 
[ ] via hand delivery 
to the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court 
I declare that I am employed in the office of an attorney that has been 
admitted to this Court at whose direction the service was made. 
Executed on October 5, 2007 at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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CWEST'S DELAWARE CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 8. CORPORATIONS 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 
SUBCHAPTER IX. MERGER, CONSOLIDATION OR CONVERSION 
-•§ 262. Appraisal rights 
(a) Any stockholder of a corporation of this State who holds shares of stock on the 
date of the making of a demand pursuant to subsection (d) of this section with 
respect to such shares, who continuously holds such shares through the effective 
date of the merger or consolidation, who has otherwise complied with subsection (d) 
of this section and who has neither voted in favor of the merger or consolidation 
nor consented thereto in writing pursuant to § 228 of this title shall be entitled 
to an appraisal by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of the stockholder's 
shares of stock under the circumstances described in subsections (b) and (c) of this 
section. As used in this section, the word "stockholder" means a holder of record 
of stock in a stock corporation and also a member of record of a nonstock 
corporation; the words "stock" and "share" mean and include what is ordinarily 
meant by those words and also membership or membership interest of a member of a 
nonstock corporation; and the words "depository receipt" mean a receipt or other 
instrument issued by a depository representing an interest in one or more shares, or 
fractions thereof, solely of stock of a corporation, which stock is deposited with 
the depository. 
(b) Appraisal rights shall be available for the shares of any class or series of 
stock of a constituent corporation in a merger or consolidation to be effected 
pursuant to § 251 (other than a merger effected pursuant to § 251(g) of this title), 
§ 252, § 254, § 257, § 258, § 263 or § 264 of this title: 
(1) Provided, however, that no appraisal rights under this section shall be 
available for the shares of any class or series of stock, which stock, or 
depository receipts in respect thereof, at the record date fixed to determine the 
stockholders entitled to receive notice of and to vote at the meeting of 
stockholders to act upon the agreement of merger or consolidation, were either (i) 
listed on a national securities exchange or (ii) held of record by more than 2,000 
holders; and further provided that no appraisal rights shall be available for any 
shares of stock of the constituent corporation surviving a merger if the merger 
did not require for its approval the vote of the stockholders of the surviving 
corporation as provided in subsection (f) of § 251 of this title. 
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection, appraisal rights under this 
section shall be available for the shares of any class or series of stock of a 
constituent corporation if the holders thereof are required by the terms of an 
agreement of merger or consolidation pursuant to §§ 251, 252, 254, 257, 258, 263 
and 264 of this title to accept for such stock anything except: 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
a. Shares of stock of the corporation surviving or resulting from such merger or 
consolidation, or depository receipts in respect thereof; 
b. Shares of stock of any other corporation, or depository receipts in respect 
thereof, which shares of stock (or depository receipts in respect thereof) or 
depository receipts at the effective date of the merger or consolidation will be 
either listed on a national securities exchange or held of record by more than 
2,000 holders; 
c. Cash in lieu of fractional shares or fractional depository receipts described 
in the foregoing subparagraphs a. and b. of this paragraph; or 
d. Any combination of the shares of stock, depository receipts and cash in lieu 
of fractional shares or fractional depository receipts described in the foregoing 
subparagraphs a., b. and c. of this paragraph. 
(3) In the event all of the stock of a subsidiary Delaware corporation party to a 
merger effected under § 253 of this title is not owned by the parent corporation 
immediately prior to the merger, appraisal rights shall be available for the 
shares of the subsidiary Delaware corporation. 
(c) Any corporation may provide in its certificate of incorporation that appraisal 
rights under this section shall be available for the shares of any class or series 
of its stock as a result of an amendment to its certificate of incorporation, any 
merger or consolidation in which the corporation is a constituent corporation or the 
sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the corporation. If the 
certificate of incorporation contains such a provision, the procedures of this 
section, including those set forth in subsections (d) and (e) of this section, shall 
apply as nearly as is practicable. 
(d) Appraisal rights shall be perfected as follows: 
(1) If a proposed merger or consolidation for which appraisal rights are provided 
under this section is to be submitted for approval at a meeting of stockholders, 
the corporation, not less than 20 days prior to the meeting, shall notify each of 
its stockholders who was such on the record date for such meeting with respect to 
shares for which appraisal rights are available pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) 
hereof that appraisal rights are available for any or all of the shares of the 
constituent corporations, and shall include in such notice a copy of this section. 
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Each stockholder electing to demand the appraisal of such stockholder's shares 
shall deliver to the corporation, before the taking of the vote on the merger or 
consolidation, a written demand for appraisal of such stockholder's shares. Such 
demand will be sufficient if it reasonably informs the corporation of the identity 
of the stockholder and that the stockholder intends thereby to demand the 
appraisal of such stockholder's shares. A proxy or vote against the merger or 
consolidation shall not constitute such a demand. A stockholder electing to take 
such action must do so by a separate written demand as herein provided. Within 10 
days after the effective date of such merger or consolidation, the surviving or 
resulting corporation shall notify each stockholder of each constituent 
corporation who has complied with this subsection and has not voted in favor of or 
consented to the merger or consolidation of the date that the merger or 
consolidation has become effective; or 
(2) If the merger or consolidation was approved pursuant to § 228 or § 253 of this 
title, then either a constituent corporation before the effective date of the 
merger or consolidation or the surviving or resulting corporation within 10 days 
thereafter shall notify each of the holders of any class or series of stock of 
such constituent corporation who are entitled to appraisal rights of the approval 
of the merger or consolidation and that appraisal rights are available for any or 
all shares of such class or series of stock of such constituent corporation, and 
shall include in such notice a copy of this section. Such notice may, and, if 
given on or after the effective date of the merger or consolidation, shall, also 
notify such stockholders of the effective date of the merger or consolidation. 
Any stockholder entitled to appraisal rights may, within 20 days after the date of 
mailing of such notice, demand in writing from the surviving or resulting 
corporation the appraisal of such holder's shares. Such demand will be sufficient 
if it reasonably informs the corporation of the identity of the stockholder and 
that the stockholder intends thereby to demand the appraisal of such holder's 
shares. If such notice did not notify stockholders of the effective date of the 
merger or consolidation, either (i) each such constituent corporation shall send a 
second notice before the effective date of the merger or consolidation notifying 
each of the holders of any class or series of stock of such constituent 
corporation that are entitled to appraisal rights of the effective date of the 
merger or consolidation or (ii) the surviving or resulting corporation shall send 
such a second notice to all such holders on or within 10 days after such effective 
date; provided, however, that if such second notice is sent more than 20 days 
following the sending of the first notice, such second notice need only be sent to 
each stockholder who is entitled to appraisal rights and who has demanded 
appraisal of such holder's shares in accordance with this subsection. An 
affidavit of the secretary or assistant secretary or of the transfer agent of the 
corporation that is required to give either notice that such notice has been given 
shall, in the absence of fraud, be prima facie evidence of the facts stated 
therein. For purposes of determining the stockholders entitled to receive either 
notice, each constituent corporation may fix, in advance, a record date that shall 
be not more than 10 days prior to the date the notice is given, provided, that if 
the notice is given on or after the effective date of the merger or consolidation, 
the record date shall be such effective date. If no record date is fixed and the 
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notice is given prior to the effective date, the record date shall be the close of 
business on the day next preceding the day on which the notice is given. 
(e) Within 120 days after the effective date of the merger or consolidation, the 
surviving or resulting corporation or any stockholder who has complied with 
subsections (a) and (d) hereof and who is otherwise entitled to appraisal rights, 
may commence an appraisal proceeding by filing a petition in the Court of Chancery 
demanding a determination of the value of the stock of all such stockholders. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, at any time within 60 days after the effective date 
of the merger or consolidation, any stockholder who has not commenced an appraisal 
proceeding or joined that proceeding as a named party shall have the right to 
withdraw such stockholder's demand for appraisal and to accept the terms offered 
upon the merger or consolidation. Within 120 days after the effective date of the 
merger or consolidation, any stockholder who has complied with the requirements of 
subsections (a) and (d) hereof, upon written request, shall be entitled to receive 
from the corporation surviving the merger or resulting from the consolidation a 
statement setting forth the aggregate number of shares not voted in favor of the 
merger or consolidation and with respect to which demands for appraisal have been 
received and the aggregate number of holders of such shares. Such written statement 
shall be mailed to the stockholder within 10 days after such stockholder's written 
request for such a statement is received by the surviving or resulting corporation 
or within 10 days after expiration of the period for delivery of demands for 
appraisal under subsection (d) hereof, whichever is later. Notwithstanding 
subsection (a) of this section, a person who is the beneficial owner of shares of 
such stock held either in a voting trust or by a nominee on behalf of such person 
may, in such person's own name, file a petition or request from the corporation the 
statement described in this subsection. 
(f) Upon the filing of any such petition by a stockholder, service of a copy thereof 
shall be made upon the surviving or resulting corporation, which shall within 20 
days after such service file in the office of the Register in Chancery in which the 
petition was filed a duly verified list containing the names and addresses of all 
stockholders who have demanded payment for their shares and with whom agreements as 
to the value of their shares have not been reached by the surviving or resulting 
corporation. If the petition shall be filed by the surviving or resulting 
corporation, the petition shall be accompanied by such a duly verified list. The 
Register in Chancery, if so ordered by the Court, shall give notice of the time and 
place fixed for the hearing of such petition by registered or certified mail to the 
surviving or resulting corporation and to the stockholders shown on the list at the 
addresses therein stated. Such notice shall also be given by 1 or more publications 
at least 1 week before the day of the hearing, in a newspaper of general circulation 
published in the City of Wilmington, Delaware or such publication as the Court deems 
advisable. The forms of the notices by mail and by publication shall be approved by 
the Court, and the costs thereof shall be borne by the surviving or resulting 
corporation. 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
(g) At the hearing on such petition, the Court shall determine the stockholders who 
have complied with this section and who have become entitled to appraisal rights. 
The Court may require the stockholders who have demanded an appraisal for their 
shares and who hold stock represented by certificates to submit their certificates 
of stock to the Register in Chancery for notation thereon of the pendency of the 
appraisal proceedings; and if any stockholder fails to comply with such direction, 
the Court may dismiss the proceedings as to such stockholder. 
(h) After the Court determines the stockholders entitled to an appraisal, the 
appraisal proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of the Court of 
Chancery, including any rules specifically governing appraisal proceedings. Through 
such proceeding the Court shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of 
any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or 
consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined 
to be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into 
account all relevant factors. Unless the Court in its discretion determines 
otherwise for good cause shown, interest from the effective date of the merger 
through the date of payment of the judgment shall be compounded quarterly and shall 
accrue at 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate (including any surcharge) as 
established from time to time during the period between the effective date of the 
merger and the date of payment of the judgment. Upon application by the surviving 
or resulting corporation or by any stockholder entitled to participate in the 
appraisal proceeding, the Court may, in its discretion, proceed to trial upon the 
appraisal prior to the final determination of the stockholders entitled to an 
appraisal. Any stockholder whose name appears on the list filed by the surviving or 
resulting corporation pursuant to subsection (f) of this section and who has 
submitted such stockholder's certificates of stock to the Register in Chancery, if 
such is required, may participate fully in all proceedings until it is finally 
determined that such stockholder is not entitled to appraisal rights under this 
section. 
(i) The Court shall direct the payment of the fair value of the shares, together 
with interest, if any, by the surviving or resulting corporation to the stockholders 
entitled thereto. Payment shall be so made to each such stockholder, in the case of 
holders of uncertificated stock forthwith, and the case of holders of shares 
represented by certificates upon the surrender to the corporation of the 
certificates representing such stock. The Court's decree may be enforced as other 
decrees in the Court of Chancery may be enforced, whether such surviving or 
resulting corporation be a corporation of this State or of any state. 
(j) The costs of the proceeding may be determined by the Court and taxed upon the 
parties as the Court deems equitable in the circumstances. Upon application of a 
stockholder, the Court may order all or a portion of the expenses incurred by any 
stockholder in connection with the appraisal proceeding, including, without 
limitation, reasonable attorney's fees and the fees and expenses of experts, to be 
charged pro rata against the value of all the shares entitled to an appraisal. 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
(k) From and after the effective date of the merger or consolidation, no stockholder 
who has demanded appraisal rights as provided in subsection (d) of this section 
shall be entitled to vote such stock for any purpose or to receive payment of 
dividends or other distributions on the stock (except dividends or other 
distributions payable to stockholders of record at a date which is prior to the 
effective date of the merger or consolidation); provided, however, that if no 
petition for an appraisal shall be filed within the time provided in subsection (e) 
of this section, or if such stockholder shall deliver to the surviving or resulting 
corporation a written withdrawal of such stockholder's demand for an appraisal and 
an acceptance of the merger or consolidation, either within 60 days after the 
effective date of the merger or consolidation as provided in subsection (e) of this 
section or thereafter with the written approval of the corporation, then the right 
of such stockholder to an appraisal shall cease. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no 
appraisal proceeding in the Court of Chancery shall be dismissed as to any 
stockholder without the approval of the Court, and such approval may be conditioned 
upon such terms as the Court deems just; provided, however that this provision shall 
not affect the right of any stockholder who has not commenced an appraisal 
proceeding or joined that proceeding as a named party to withdraw such stockholder's 
demand for appraisal and to accept the terms offered upon the merger or 
consolidation within 60 days after the effective date of the merger or 
consolidation, as set forth m subsection (e) of this section. 
(1) The shares of the surviving or resulting corporation to which the shares of such 
objecting stockholders would have been converted had they assented to the merger or 
consolidation shall have the status of authorized and unissued shares of the 
surviving or resulting corporation. 
Current through 76 Laws 2007, ch. 181. Revisions to Acts made by 
the Delaware Code Revisors were unavailable at time of publication. 
Copr. © 2007 Thomson/West. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF AVNER KALAY 
I, Avner Kalay, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: I have 
personal knowledge of the items contained in this affidavit and would testify consistent 
hereto if I were called to testify. 
1. I am a professor of Finance at the University of Utah David Eccles School of 
Business in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. I received my B.A. in economics from Tel Aviv University in 1973, my M.S 
in Business Administration from the University of Rochester in 1977 and a 
Ph.D in Business Administration from the University of Rochester in 1979. 
3. 1 was a member of NYU's finance department during 1978-1987, and was 
tenured at NYU in 1985 
4. I have previously been the Chairman of the Finance Department at Tel Aviv \ 
University, and presently am still a professor of finance there. P1 
an 
5. I have also worked for the Securities and Exchange Commission as a QQV 
consultant in Washington, DC. N $ 
6. I have been published numerous times in journals in the finance community 
and co-wrote Dividend Policy; Its Impact on Value, in 1999. 
7. I am co-founder and co-organizer of the Utah Winter Finance Conference held 
every year since 1991. 
8 -I have served as an expert witness in a number of cases involving business 
valuations, including but not limited to, MCN Energy V Crown Asphalt 
Corporation, Etrade V LifeWise, and SCO V. IBM. 
9. I have been a consultant for numerous companies operating in different 
industries, including Coco Cola, American Express, Intel, Hermes Associates, 
among others. 
10. hi a recent ranking of financial economists by citation to their work in top 
finance journals from 1974-1998 ranked me at the top 100 in the world. 
11.1 have participated in over 50 professional conferences as a presenter, 
discussant, and session chair on a range of financial issues, and I give frequent 
lectures about my research at other universities. 
12. On or about March 2006 I prepared a valuation report for Plaintiffs in this 
mattei. 
13 In my report I determined that Campus Pipeline at the time of acquisition had 
an approximate value of $73.7 million to $83.2 million. 
14. In the March 2006 report later modified by my deposition testimony, I 
concluded that the fair value of Mr. Borghetti's shaies at the time of the 
merger was between $4.2 million and $6,706 million. 
15. In my report I employed a widely used and generally accepted valuation 
method called the Black-Scholes model, developed by Fischer Black and 
Myron Scholes in 1973 as a method used to value options. 
16 In my report I point out that the Black-Scholes method is an appropriate 
method for valuing equity in a levered firm, because equity in a levered firm, 
such as Campus Pipeline, can be viewed as a call option to buy the assets of 
the firm (Report, 9). 
17. The Black Scholes option pricing model is an appropriate valuation model for 
equity in a levered firm whether or not the firm is in financial distress or 
operational distress. It is not disputed that Campus Pipeline had "debt-like" 
potential obligation to its preferred stockholders. So whether or not Campus 
Pipeline was in financial distress or in operational distress the Black Scholes 
option pricing model can be used to value its equity. 
18. The appraisal action statute in Delaware provides that value the court 
considers is the fair value of the shares. Delaware Corporations Code, section 
262(h): "After determining the stockholders entitled to an appraisal the Court 
shall appraise the shares, detemiining their fair value exclusive of any element 
of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or 
consolidation, together with a fair rate of interest, if any, to be paid upon the 
amount determined to be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the 
Court shall take into account all relevant factors." 
19. Campus Pipeline at the time of acquisition had preferred stockholders, and 
holders of Series A and B preferred stock were to be paid the sum of $82.93 
million in the event of liquidation, prior to any payment to the common 
stockholders. Because of this large liquidation preference the preferred stock 
shares were debt like in nature making Campus Pipeline a highly levered firm 
(See, Kalay Report 9-10 "Equity in a levered firm can be viewed as a call 
option to buy the assets of the firm . . . The analogy to the case of Campus 
Pipeline is straightforward. Campus Pipeline, at the time of the acquisition by 
SCT, had almost no long-term debt. Y e t . . . holders of Series A and B 
preferred stock are to be paid the sum of $82.93 million in the event of 
liquidation prior to any payment to the common stockholders."; See 
Grabowski Report 13-] 4 "Campus Pipeline is considered to be a highly 
levered firm because of the large liquidation preference ($82.9 million) of the 
preferred shares, which are debt-like in nature."). 
20. Pursuant to the literature on the subject and the research I have encountered, 
along with my education, experience and training, it is clear that Black-
Scholes is the seminal work in options pricing theory, is the most widely used 
and most recognized model for the valuation of options and has not only been 
employed to value options, but also to value equity and debt in a company like 
Campus Pipeline. 
21. In reviewing Defendant's expert report prepared by Roger Grabowski, I 
noticed that despite Grabowski *s deposition testimony that my use of the 
Black-Scholes model was inappropriate because Black-Scholes is generally 
used to value publicly traded companies, Grabowski himself in his report 
discusses the model's use in the area of real options where the underlying 
asset is not traded. 
22. Grabowski's report on Campus Pipeline even mentions that the Black-Scholes 
method is utilized in the financial community and is also utilized in some 
circumstances, to value the equity of a company. 
23. In my opinion, the discount cash flow analysis, used by Hoffman and 
Grabowski, can result in undervaluing of the firm because that analysis does 
not capture certain complexities and nuances that the Black-Scholes option 
pricing theory does. 
24. My report assumes that no acquisition took place, and is dependent on the 
assumption that CPI continued to operate for 9 to 13 years, but the methods 
employed by Defendant's expert, the Discounted Cash Flow Analysis, also 
makes these same assumptions. 
25. The income approach, market approach, and cost approach are generally 
accepted valuation methodologies, and the Black-Scholes method is also 
generally accepted and has been in use since 1973. It is in fact an "income 
approach" method. 
26. Valuation guidelines state clearly that when a good estimate of the market 
value is available it is best to use it. I use the price paid for Campus Pipeline 
as the starting point of my evaluation of the market value of its equity. That 1 
use the price paid for Campus Pipeline to compute its full market value is my 
use of the market approach. Thus my analysis is consistent with the income 
approach as well as the market approach. 
27. The "bad act" discussed in my report is relevant only to the issue as to 
whether Campus Pipeline should have been sold from the financial economics 
perspective. It is not utilized in my calculation of fair value and has no effect 
on the fair value issue. 
28. Attached is my expert report which is tme, accurate, reliable, and provides 
my opinion in this case other than the error in the final calculation corrected 
by me in my deposition, such that Borghetti's damages range from $4.2 
million to $6,706 million. 
29. The following is some of the authoritative literature that I believe supports my 
conclusions on the use of the Black-Scholes methodology (along with other 
literature cited in my deposition): 
a. The Black-Scholes model is the seminal work in options pricing theoiy 
and it has not only been utilized in valuing options, but has been used 
to value equity and debt in a company. (See generally, Damodaran, 
Mwath
- Investment Valuation- Tnnls and Techniques for 
BelermininaAe^lHcoMnv Asset. 2nd Ed. New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc. 1996, page 828-829). 
b. Scholes and [Robert] Merton shared the 1997 Nobel Prize in 
economics for their work on the development of this formula 
(Brealey, Richard A., and Stuart C. Myers, and Alan J. Marcus. 
Fundamentals of Corporate Finance. 4th F.d New York: McGraw Hill 
Companies, Inc., 2004, page 651) 
c An options approach to valuation has been cited as a powerful tool in 
the financial community because it allows an analyst to capture certain 
complexities and nuances . . [and] using the risk adjusted discount 
rate version of the discount cash flow (DCF) analysis can result in 
overlooking an important option that is available and substantially 
undervaluing the firm. (See, Boer, Peter F. The Real Options Solution-
Finding Total Value in a High-Risk World New York John Wiley & 
Sons, Lie, pp vn, 95, 100) 
d It has been heavily cited and discussed that equity can be viewed as a 
call option and therefore one would value equity as an option using the 
option pricing technique (See, Damodaran, Aswath (2006) The Cost 
of Distiess Survival Truncation Risk and Valuation Social Science 
Research Network http //ssrn com/abstract=887129, pages 2, 36) 
e Equity is a kind of option on the assets (See, Callaghan, Clark and 
JackAyei (1999) Good News for the Black Scholes Suffeieis No 1 
Norton Bankr L Adviser 7) 
f Since 1973, the Black-Scholes-Merton methodology has been applied 
to a wide variety of contingent claims Financial guaiantees can be 
analyzed as put options, and the equity of a levered firm can be 
analyzed as a call option on the firm's assets " (Gray, D and Robeit 
Merton and Zvi Bodie "A New Framework for Analyzing and 
Managing Maciofinancial Risks " Piepared foi the CV Stan/RED 
Confeience on Finance and the Macioeconomy, October 11-12, 2002 
New York, N Y , page 4) 
g Some analysts have found that it is possible to considei a company's 
equity as a call option, wherein the underlying asset is the value of the 
company's debt In this context, option pricing models, such as the 
Black-Scholes model can be used for valuing a target's equity (Feins, 
Kenneth R. and Barbara S. Petitt Valuation: Avoiding the Winner's 
Curse. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc.2002, pagel26). 
h. In an article entitled "IS: Valuation Methods: Insights from Capital 
Markets Theory and Practice," Tim Weitzel, Cornelia Gel lings, Dauiel 
Beimborn and Wolfgang Konig, explore the use of the Real Options 
Approach for valuing information systems (IS) and information 
technology (IT) businesses. They state that "IS valuation has long 
been a core research challenge [and] real options approaches have 
received attention as methodological means of overcoming some 
shortcomings of traditional valuation approaches like net present value 
. . . The real options approach employs the financial option theory 
based on the Black-Scholes formula. (Beimborn, Daniel and Cornelia 
(Sellings, Wolfgang Konig, Tim Weitzel. (2003). "IS Valuation 
Methods: Insights from Capital Markets Theory and Practice." 
Presented at the 7th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, 
July 10-13, 2003, Adelaide, South Australia, pp. 1,10)/ 
. In the article entitled "High Stakes in High Technology: High-Tech 
Market Values as Options," authors Michael Darby, Qiao Liu, and 
Lynne Zucker explore the theory that a high tech firm can be valued 
using option theory. They state that "because we know that 
achievement of technological breakthroughs - or failure to achieve 
them in R&D project, affects the firm's market valuation, we expect 
that a certain type of discontinuity in the firm's market value will 
occur whenever the firm makes frontier discoveries or announces 
failure . . . we take a "traditional view" of treating the firm's equity 
value as a call option written on the firm's valued assets .. " (Darby, 
Michael and Qiao Liu and Lynne Zucker. (2004) "High Stakes in High 
Technology: High-Tech Market Values as Options." Economic 
Inquiry, Vol.42, No.3: 351-369 at 352). 
j . Aswath Damodaran, professor of Finance at the Stern School of 
Business at NYU teaches equity valuation and financing courses, and 
in his book, Investment Valuation: Tools and Techniques for 
Determining the Value of Any Asset he utilizes the Black-Scholes 
model to determine the values of equity and debt in a firm. He says 
that equity is a call option on the value of the firm and therefore 
employs the option pricing technique. (Damodaran, A (2002). 
Investment Valuation: Tools and Techniques for Determining; the 
Value of Any Asset 2nd Ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, page 
828). 
k. Many in the field have deemed option pricing theory a viable 
alternative to other traditional valuation models Because of 
limitations associated with the implementation of other traditional 
valuation models, the 1990's saw the development of a number of 
alternative valuation frameworks . . . Discounted cash flow analysis 
(DCFA) assumes the capital structure of a company is stable over 
time. In the case of a leveraged buy-out or a debt restructuring after a 
meiger or an acquisition, the analyst needs an alternative approach that 
ovei comes the assumption of stable capital structuie underlying DCFA 
Finally, where investments are structured as sequential rounds of 
financing, some analysts have found it useful to model the valuation 
using real options analysis (Ferns, K Petitt, B Valuation Avoiding 
the Winner's Curse. Financial Times Prentice Hall Books, New York, 
NY 2002, page 108) 
In a papei by Andieas Chantou and Lenos Tugeoigis, the authois 
point out that the equity of a levered firm can be viewed as a call 
option to acqune the value of the fnm's assets, and they employ the 
option pricing theory 01 contingent claims analysis introduced by the 
seminal work of Black and Scholes and Merton They further discuss 
how the Black and Sholes and Merton woik of option valuation or 
contingent claim analysis has been applied to the valuation of vauous 
corporate secunties seen as packages of claims oi options on the total 
value of the firm's assets (Chantou, Andieas and Lenos Trigeons 
Option-Based Bankiuptcv Prediction Social Science Reseaich 
Network June 2000) 
Black-Scholes applies to contingent claims, theiefore you ought to be 
able to analyze all kinds of assets using Black-Scholes techniques 
(See, Callaghan, Clark and Jack Ayei (1999) Good News foi Black 
Scholes Sufferers No 1 Norton BankrL Advisei 7, 10) 
n. The options pricing method takes into account factors that the other 
methods may ignore, such as flexibility of the firm and distress of the 
firm. The option pricing method captures the value of a firm's 
flexibility and takes into account the company's distress as well, and 
when dealing with a distressed firm, you have to consider that the 
equity of the firm takes on option characteristics. (See, Copeland, T., 
and Tim Roller and Jack Murrin. (1994) Valuation: Measuring and 
Managing the Value of Companies. New York: McKinsey & 
Company, Inc., page 399; See Also, Damodaran, Aswath. (2006) The 
Cost of Distress: Survival. Truncation Risk and Valuation Social 
Science Research Network: http://ssrnxom/abstract=887129, pages 2, 
36). 
o. The more traditional valuation methods such as the risk adjusted 
discount rate version of the Discounted Cash Flow analysis (DCF A), 
tends to underestimate the value of a firm's equity. Most DCF 
valuation approaches only define a single scenario . . . DCF valuations 
[can] underestimate the value of the firm . . . because they ignore the 
options that these firms have to invest more in the fiiture and take 
advantage of unexpected success in their businesses. These options 
are increasingly called "real options" because the underlying assets are 
real investments, and they might explain, at least in some cases why 
discounted cash flows understate the value of technology firms . 
(Roos, G and Oliver Gupta. (2001) "Valuation of Private Technology 
Firms: A Discussion Paper on Dealing with the Associated Problems. 
Intellectual Capital Services, pp 24-25) 
p. The discounted cash flow models understate the value of equity in 
firms with high financial leverage and negative operating income, 
since they do not reflect the option that equity investors have to 
liquidate the firm's assets. Black and Scholes suggest that the equity 
in a levered firm can be thought of as a call option (Pengfei, H and 
Hua Yimin. (2002) Real Option Valuation in High-Tech Firm. 
Gothenburg University School of Economics and Commercial Law, 
pp. 41-42) 
q. The field of finance has developed a variety of option pricing models 
with the fundamental ones being the binomial model and the Black-
Scholes model option pricing models. Over time, these models and 
their extensions have been used in a variety of evaluative settings 
(Benaroch, Michel and Robert Kauffman. (1999) "A Case for Using 
ReaI_Options Pricing Analysis to Evaluate Information Technology 
Project Investments." Information Systems Research, Vol. 10, 
No. 1-70-86) 
The Black-Scholes method is currently the most recognized and 
widely used theoretical model foi the valuation of options. (Hitchner, 
James R. Financial Valuations: Applications and Models. Hoboken: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003, page 927) 
s. The Black-Scholes model now seems to be by far the most important 
single breakthrough of the "golden decade," and ranks with the 
Modigliani-Miller Theorem and the CAPM of Sharpe and Lintner in 
its overall importance for financial theory and practice. (Duffie, 
Darrell. (1992) Dynamic Asset Pricing Theory. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, page xiii). 
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I, Daniel Greenwood, being first duly sworn, deposes and state as follows: I have 
personal knowledge of the items contained in this Affidavit and would testify consistent 
hereto if I were called to testify. 
1. I am a Professor of Law at the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University 
of Utah, where I have been employed since 1992. 
2. I am a graduate of Harvard College and Yale Law School. 
3. After I graduated from law school I clerked for the Honorable Richard Owen, 
USDJ, in the Southern District of New York and then practiced corporate 
litigation as an associate attorney with Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton for 
several years. 
4. My major area of academic research is the theory and practice of corporate 
governance, with a special emphasis on the relationships of the various parties 
to the corporation as governed by the law of fiduciary duty. 
5. My opinions stated below are based on the evidence I have reviewed in this 
case, my knowledge of general principles and goals of corporate governance 
in general and the funding of start-up companies specifically, and the case law 
of Delaware, Utah and other American jurisdictions. 
6. The circumstances in the Campus Pipeline, Inc. ("Campus Pipeline"), and 
System & Computer Technology, Inc. ("SCT"), transaction involve the 
important fiduciary obligations that insiders and dominant shareholders have 
toward minority, passive, shareholders in closely held corporations. Since 
minority shareholders in closely held corporations are particularly susceptible 
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to exploitation by over-reaching insiders, courts are especially careful to 
impose high fiduciary duties. 
7. The directors and managers of Campus Pipeline violated their duty of loyalty 
by placing the interests of managers in retaining their job, of insiders 
including SCT, of preferred shareholders, and of continuing development of 
the product, above the interest of common shareholders in obtaining value for 
their shares. Had they not done so, they would have decided that selling the 
company at that time was not in the best interests of the company and its 
stockholders. Moreover, once they made the decision to sell the company, 
they failed to fulfill their Revlon duty to maximize the return to shareholders 
in a sale. 
8. The directors and managers of Campus Pipeline violated their duty of care by 
failing to employ appropriate outside experts, by instructing their expert to 
limit its inquiry to such a degree as to make the expert opinion meaningless, 
by failing to explore possible alternative transactions that would have created 
more value for the common shares, and by deciding to enter into a transaction 
that offered the common shares no value while giving significant value to 
insiders. 
9. SCT - the dominant shareholder - benefited at the expense of and detriment 
to the other shareholders, because the sale of Campus Pipeline to SCT allowed 
SCT to acquire the assets of Campus Pipeline with no payment to Campus 
Pipeline's common stock. 
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10. The managers, inside directors and dominant shareholder of Campus Pipeline 
had serious conflicts of interest, which they allowed to distort their judgment 
and deflect them from their clear legal duties. 
11. The individual insiders received valuable compensation, retention bonuses 
and other payments in connection with the sale of Campus Pipeline and thus 
had a financial interest in consummating the sale regardless of whether it was 
in the interest of Campus Pipeline or its outside stockholders. SCT, the 
dominant shareholder, received the assets and business of Campus Pipeline 
without making a payment to the other common shareholders and thus had an 
interest in minimizing the sales price in conflict with the interest of the outside 
stockholders. These financial interests created a conflict of interest and 
precluding their acting as independent brokers of the fate of the common 
stock. 
12. The independent directors of Campus Pipeline failed to insist on independent 
financial and legal advice, failed to conduct an independent investigation into 
the merits of the proposed transaction from the perspective of the common 
stock as a whole, and allowed themselves to be used for the interests of the 
insiders in breach of their duties of care and loyalty. 
13. Thomas Weisel Partners, who were employed by the directors to evaluate the 
proposed transaction, was financially interested in the transaction as a holder 
of Campus Pipeline preferred stock, with financial interests at odds with those 
of the common stock. 
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14. The financial interests of the common stock barred this transaction, which 
voluntarily eliminated their interests in a going concern without any payment 
whatsoever. A Board of Directors acting in the interest of the company and 
its common stock would not have chosen to voluntarily sell Campus Pipeline 
for a sum less than the preference value of the preferred stock. At any sale 
price below the preference value, the common stock would receive nothing, 
which is the worst possible outcome for the common stock. Thus, any course 
of action that offered the common shareholders any possibility of future value 
would have been preferable from the perspective of the common stock. 
15. Fundamental principles of corporate law require that the directors act in the 
interest of all the common stock, and not merely the majority shareholder. 
16. In the venture capital context, it is routine for investors to negotiate the right 
to close down the company at various points if it is not doing well. No such 
agreement appears to be applicable here. Given the prevalence of such 
agreements, its absence should be seen as a contractual acceptance of the 
usual rule that when the interests of the common stock conflict with those of 
the preferred stock, the law requires the directors to put the interests of the 
common stock first. This is particularly true where, as here, the directors 
propose to exclude the common stock from any interest in the company's 
future, thus destroying the entire economic basis of the common stock. 
17. Since the sale of Campus Pipeline to SCT gave no value to the common stock, 
it cannot have been in the interest of the common stock. Therefore, the 
5 
director's approval of this transaction violated their fiduciary duties as a 
matter of clear law. 
18. Plaintiffs in this action have calculated their damages using the "real options" 
method. This is a standard method of valuing equity interests, which 
emphasizes the value of the equity-holders right to decide whether to continue 
or fold the business. I have taught coiporate finance to law students for many 
years. The option theory method of valuing equity appears in each of the 
standard law school corporate finance texts as a central part of the standard 
understanding of how and why equity investments have value. (See, e.g., 
Carney, Corporate Finance, 539-540; Klein & Coffee, Business Organization 
and Finance, 341-342; Bratton, Corporate Finance, 136, excerpts collectively 
attached hereto as Exhibit R) 
19. Attached is my expert report which is true, accurate, reliable, and provides my 
opinions and the basis for my opinions in this case. Set forth in detail in my 
report is my opinion that: 
a. The directors and officers of Campus Pipeline breached their fiduciary 
duty of loyalty because they had financial conflicts of interest in the 
transaction, they took no measures to mitigate these conflicts of 
interest or obtain independent advice, and they placed their own 
personal interests and the interests of SCT ahead of the interests of 
Campus Pipeline and its outside stockholders, 
b. The officers and directors of Campus Pipeline breached their fiduciary 
duty of care because they exercised no care in this transaction in 
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failing to consider alternative course of action (including operating the 
company or finding alternative transactions), and in instructing their 
outside consultant, Thomas Weisel Partners to assume the very result 
in needed to consider, and they were grossly negligent in terminating 
the interests of the common stock for a payment of zero, 
c. The directors and officers of Campus Pipeline breached their Revlon 
duties, because when the sale of a company becomes inevitable it is 
their sole duty to maximize the return to the common shareholders, 
and Defendants approved a transaction that gave the common 
shareholders nothing. 
1 declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed 
this 21st day of November, 2006, at Hempstead, N.Y. 
DANIEL JH GREENWOOD 
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